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1RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICERS 
AND SECTION 113(c)(6) OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT:
A DORMANT PROVISION WITH A USEFUL FUNCTION
PART I
INTRODUCTION
Most credit the genesis of the public welfare statutes and the responsible corporate officer 
doctrine with two Supreme Court cases, U.S. v. Dotterweich [FN1] and U.S. v. Park, [FN2] where 
the Supreme Court upheld the use of strict liability for misdemeanor violations of the Food, Drug 
and Cosmetics Act.   But the doctrine may be older still.  Hammurabi’s Code of Laws [FN3] 
made a residential home builder criminally liable “if a builder build a house for some one, and 
does not construct it properly, and the house which he built fall in and kill its owner, then that 
builder shall be put to death.” [FN4]  If the builder were liable for the construction faults of his 
officers, this would make this the very first public welfare statute involving responsible corporate 
officers (RCOs). [FN5]  What Hammurabi’s Code recognized, as did Dotterweich in 1943, is that 
those who have a duty to prevent serious harm on a helpless public should be held liable. [FN6]
The flurry of criticism over the addition of the RCO provision to the Clean Air Act [FN7] 
has focused on its application of strict liability and the mens rea requirement.  Dotterweich and 
Park both applied what appeared to be strict liability for violations of the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetics Act.  The fear was that if “the building fell,” non-culpable corporate officers would be 
held strictly liable, and like the builders in Hammurabi’s time, faces not misdemeanor sanctions 
but the most severe felony penalties. [FN8]
This fear was unfounded.  The “liability net” which many believed would be cast far and 
wide caught no fish.  No corporate officer was held strictly liable; public welfare offenses 
evolved as the courts conscientiously applied the “knowing” requirement to environmental 
statutes and the RCO provision.
However, traditional criminal law theory and case law support another use of the RCO 
provision, one in which the statute is the source of a duty for a corporate officer who is in 
responsible relation to a public danger: the duty to actively seek out to prevent or remedy 
violations.  This paper will explore the value of defining the RCO provision as the actus reus of 
a crime—the omission or breach of a statutory duty.  This theory can further the environmental 
regulatory program by deterring would be violators and by increasing compliance, a value that 
2exists despite the fact that the RCO provision is rarely used to prosecute corporate officers.  Part 
II will trace the evolution of criminal provisions and the addition of the responsible corporate 
officer clause in environmental statutes.  Part III will the follow the case law that has slowly 
evolved.  Part IV will discuss why the RCO provision is not used more often, and how it 
nevertheless serves an important function in environmental law. Part V will conclude with 
suggested improvements of the legislature could clarify how and when the RCO doctrine should 
apply.  
PART II
THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER 
IN ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES
Development of Criminal Provisions in Environmental Statutes
During the 1970s and 1980s when the major federal environmental statutes were first 
enacted, rigorous enforcement of the criminal provisions was the exception rather than the rule.  
[FN9]  Limited enforcement during the implementation phase was seen as simply fair, as 
regulatory agencies focused on educating industry on how to comply with the vast and 
comprehensive regulatory scheme, which demanded the “dynamic and evolutionary” changes in 
behavior. [FN10]  Compliance, implementation, and education were the main goals.  [FN11]  
Also, lack of criminal enforcement was due to the fact that the first criminal provisions were 
misdemeanors, and frequently involved only minimal penalties-- so there was little justification 
for the added burden and expense of a criminal prosecution; [FN12] most of the EPA and the 
Department of Justice’s legal resources were devoted to defending the newly enacted laws from 
various challenges. [FN13]  
Stiffer Criminal Penalties-- Public Perception and Public Outrage
Once the regulatory program was largely in place, criminal provisions with felony 
provisions were added to environmental statutes. [FN14]  Although criminal provisions were for 
the most part added gradually, public outrage to environmental disasters led to quick 
congressional response that included the addition of criminal provisions to environmental 
statutes.  [FN15]  Two such disasters, the 1984 release of cyanide gas in Bhopal, India, and the 
1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in the Prince William Sound, impacted the how the public viewed 
environmental violations: that violations of environmental laws were serious crimes deserving of 
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Union Carbide, Bhopal India 1984
In December 1984, a tank at a Union Carbide pesticide manufacturing facility in Bhopal, 
India, containing methyl isocyanate, an extremely toxic cyanide compound, leaked. [FN16]  A 
dense cloud of the toxic gas formed and then spread out over an area of 40 square kilometers.  
Some 2000 people died in the first three days, and the gas cloud ultimately killed over 8,000 
people. [FN17]  Most of the victims, consisting of impoverished squatters who lived next to the 
factor in huts, died as a result of pulmonary edemas and respiratory infections, and 170,000 more 
suffered other injuries. [FN18]  Survivors continue to suffer from an increased number of 
stillbirths and spontaneous abortions. [FN19]  Faulty valves that had not been adequately 
maintained caused the leak; there was also a lack of preventive and containment measures in the 
building where the tank was housed.  [FN20]  Union Carbide’s behavior subsequent to the 
accident did little to add to a growing public perception of corporate indifference—each victim 
was compensated less than $500 U.S. [FN21] 
Prince William Sound and the Exxon-Valdez 1989
On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker grounded on Bligh Reef, spilling nearly 
11 million gallons into the biologically rich waters of the Prince William Sound. [FN22]  
Although the accident itself did not result in a loss of human life, it did severely damage a 
pristine ecosystem.  Also, the damages to the economy and those living there were beyond 
calculation. An investigation revealed that Exxon failed to provide sufficient crew for the vessel, 
and that the ship lacked adequate navigation equipment. [FN23]  Also, Exxon had been aware 
that the captain suffered from alcoholism, [FN24] a fact Exxon knew before March 24, 1989. 
[FN25]
The CAA 1990 Amendments: Overview. 
Whether the result of accidents like these, or a growing concern about the environment, 
by the 1990s, the public overwhelmingly favored broadening of criminal liability for violations 
of environmental laws.  A survey conducted in 1990 found that 72% of the public was in favor of 
incarceration of deliberate environmental violators.  [FN26] The public rated environmental crime 
seventh in importance in national priorities. [FN27]  
Between 1988-1990, Congress added significantly more stringent environmental 
standards and tougher criminal provisions. [FN28] The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
4followed this trend, and generally strengthened environmental protections by adding provisions 
for ozone and carbon monoxide in non-attainment areas, added provisions limiting emissions 
from motor vehicles, increasing the types of regulated pollutants. [FN29]  The 1990 Amendments 
likewise increased the severity of its criminal sanctions; most all “knowing” violations were 
upgraded to felonies. [FN30] Penalties were increased from two years to five years for most 
violations, and from six months to two years for knowingly making false statements, with 
doubled penalties for the second violation. [FN31]  In addition, Congress added a “knowing 
endangerment” provision which imposes a maximum fine of $250,000, and up to 15 years in 
prison. [FN32]
Shifting Responsibility 
An important theme contained in 1990 Amendments is one of congressional intent to 
shift responsibility from employees “merely doing their jobs” to senior management-- corporate 
officers and agents who are in the best position to ensure compliance with environmental laws, 
and those in the position to best prevent violations. [FN33]  This shift is apparent in a number of 
ways.  In the definition section, § 302(e), Congress expanded the definition of “persons” to 
include a number of entities: “individuals,” in addition to “corporations, partnerships, 
associations, States, municipality, political subdivision of a State, and any agency, department, or 
instrumentality of the United States and any officer, agent, or employee thereof.” [FN34]  § 
113(h) was amended to include “operators” in the definition of person, that is, any person who is 
senior management personnel” or “corporate officer.” [FN35]  This paragraph specifically 
excludes any “employee who is carrying out his normal activities and who is acting under orders 
from the employer,” although such employees can be held criminally liable under both 
provisions if they act “knowingly or willfully.” [FN36]  Similarly, supervisors can be held 
criminally liable when they exercise “substantial control” over the workplace and the procedures 
employed. [FN37]
Responsible Corporate Officer Provision 
The 1990 Amendments also added the “responsible corporate officer” provision to its 
definition of “person” in subsection (c)(6). [FN38]  This provision mirrors an identical one that 
appeared in the Clean Water Act in the 1977 Amendments.  [FN39]  What was true of both 
provisions is that neither in the 1977 enactment nor in 1990 in the Clean Air Act Amendments 
did Congress explain why. [FN40] The solitary comment when RCO was added to the Clean Air 
5Act was, “The committee intends that criminal penalties be sought against those corporate 
officers under whose responsibility a violation has taken place and not just those employees 
directly involved in the operation of the violating source.” [FN41]  However, courts have used 
two canons of statutory construction to interpret the RCO.  The first is that the legislature 
intended to give effect to every word in the statute; [FN42] second, when the legislature “borrows 
an already judicially interpreted phrase from an old statute to use it in a new statute, it is 
presumed that the legislature intends to adopt not merely the old phrase but the judicial
construction of that phrase.” [FN43] Hammurabi’s Code notwithstanding, the courts looked to 
the genesis of the RCO doctrine in the early Supreme Court decisions of U.S. v. Dotterweich
[FN44] and US v. Park [FN 45] to give meaning to the responsible corporate officer provision. 
[FN46]
PART III
THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER 
CASE LAW
U.S. v. Dotterweich
Dotterweich was the President and General Manager of Buffalo Pharmaceutical, Inc., a 
company that purchased drugs from manufacturers, repacked and then distributed them under its 
own label.  [FN47] Despite the fact that Dotterweich argued that had no personal knowledge of 
the shipments, and therefore could not be found liable, he was convicted of misbranding and 
shipping adulterated drugs, a misdemeanor under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 
[FN48]  
In upholding the conviction, the Supreme Court found that the FDCA’s misdemeanor 
penalties served as an important and necessary means of regulation by acting as an incentive, to 
keep adulterated drugs from the public. [FN49] Dotterweich also must be seen in an historical 
context—this was the beginning, as the Court noted, of an era of modern industrialism, where a 
helpless public was “largely beyond self protection.” [FN50]  The Court also upheld the 
conviction although the statute applied strict liability, noting that Congress did not intend the 
FDCA to have a mens rea requirement, [FN51] and the misdemeanor sanctions were justified, 
despite the absence of culpable conduct, because of the corporate officer’s responsibility toward 
the public. [FN52]  “Such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal 
6conduct--awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of 
acting upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger.”  
[FN53]  In somewhat circular logic, the Court here established the two bases underlying the 
responsible corporate officer doctrine.  First, in certain cases, a conviction would be upheld 
without culpable conduct.  Second, that strict liability could be imposed when the corporate 
official has failed in his or her duty, that is, when the officer has a “responsible relationship” to a 
public danger. [FN54]
U.S. v. Park 
The Court expanded the concept of what constitutes a “relation to public danger” in 
Park. [FN55]  Like Dotterweich, Park was the president of a large commercial distribution chain, 
a retail food company called Acme Markets, Inc.  [FN56]  Acme employed 36,000 people, and 
had 16 warehouses throughout the US.  [FN57]  In 1970, the Food and Drug Administration 
advised Park personally of appalling rodent infestation in two of Acme’s warehouses, one in 
Philadelphia and a second in Baltimore.  As late as March 1972, FDA inspections revealed that 
conditions had improved but that there was still evidence that mice and rats excrement had 
contaminated food containers. [FN58]  In a letter written to Acme, the FDA inspector noted that 
the “reprehensible conditions obviously existed for a prolonged period of time without any 
detection, or were completely ignored.” [FN59]  Park testified that he was ultimately responsible 
for the operations of the company, and that he had been given the responsibility to oversee the 
sanitary conditions of the warehouses. [FN60]  In his defense, Park argued that as head of a large 
corporation, he could not manage the day to day operation of a large corporation, therefore, he 
had to put his faith in “dependable subordinates,” which he had done, and therefore could not be 
found criminally liable.  [FN61]
As in Dotterweich the Court upheld the conviction by recognizing that a corporate 
officer’s “act, default, or omission” could be the basis for criminal liability.  The Court cited to a 
number of lower court cases that recognized a vested duty in corporate officers to oversee and 
manage and to “devise whatever measures are necessary” to ensure public safety, and that the 
law imposed not only a duty to seek out and remedy violations, but to actively prevent them from 
occurring. [FN62] 
The Court presciently noted that Parks’ holding, in isolation, could support that a finding 
of guilt could be “predicated solely on the defendant’s position in the corporation,” implicitly 
7acknowledging that status based offenses are per se unconstitutional, and anticipating mens rea
challenges that were to come in future public welfare statutes. [FN63]  However, the Court 
focused on Park’s duty with regard to the corporation and to the public at large, noting the 
prosecution’s closing:  “Mr. Park… was responsible for seeing that sanitation was taken care of, 
and he had a system set up that was supposed to do that. This system didn't work. It didn't work 
three times. At some point in time, Mr. Park has to be held responsible for the fact that his 
system isn't working.” [FN 64]  The Court went on: 
[t]he Government establishes a prima facie case when it introduces evidence 
sufficient to warrant a finding by the trier of the facts that the defendant had, by 
reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority either to 
prevent in the first instance, or promptly to correct, the violation complained of, 
and that he failed to do so.  The failure thus to fulfill the duty imposed by the 
interaction of the corporate agent's authority and the statute furnishes a sufficient 
causal link. The considerations, which prompted the imposition of this duty, and 
the scope of the duty, provide the measure of culpability. (Emphasis added). 
[FN65]
Park strongly establishes that the responsible corporate officer provision is based in a 
duty created by the statute, and that knowledge of ongoing violations, and the failure to act on 
that knowledge is strongly indicative of culpability.  Also important in future cases was that the 
Court implicitly recognizes “impossibility to prevent” the violation as an affirmative defense.  
[FN66]     
Two Uses Of The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine 
Dotterweich and Park support two possible uses of the RCO doctrine. The first of these is 
that the RCO doctrine creates an affirmative duty for the corporate officer to act, with the statute 
as the source of the duty.  [FN67] The breach or omission to fulfill that duty flowing from a 
statutory obligation acts as a basis for either tort or criminal liability—a proposition firmly 
established in state and federal law. [FN68]  RCOs who are “responsible” under the statue have a 
duty to seek out and prevent those violations over which they have responsibility. [FN69]  
A variation of the statute as the source of the duty is that the duty is imposed because of 
the officer’s status as a RCO.  [FN70]  However, this approach is far less defensible because the 
Supreme Court has rejected the idea of status-based crimes.  [FN71]  
8The second approach is that the RCO doctrine imposes either a strict liability on the 
RCO, or that it lowers the government’s evidentiary burden by presuming mens rea. [FN72]
Environmental Statutes as Public Welfare Statutes
Unlike the FDCA, the CAA, CWA and other environmental statutes contain a mens rea
requirement of “knowingly” in most instances.  [FN73]  Also, unlike the misdemeanor provisions 
contained in the FDCA, environmental statutes contain felony provisions. [FN74]  An early 
question in interpreting the RCO provision is whether such statutes could be construed as public 
welfare statues.  With the notable exception of the Fifth Circuit, [FN75] the courts offered an 
early clarification that in fact they were.  [FN76]  This classification has added importance as 
courts have used it to uniformly reject a specific intent requirement in environmental law’s 
criminal provisions. [FN77] That is, the government is not required to prove that the violator 
knew that his conduct violated the law, for example that a permit was required, or the violator 
knew the exact conditions of the permit were violated. [FN78]  The rationale for not requiring 
specific intent is the set forth in U.S. v. Int'l Minerals, and is based on a high likelihood that the 
regulator knows that “when dangerous waste materials are involved, the problablity of regulation 
is so great, that anyone who is aware he is in possession of them must be presumed to be aware 
of the regulation.” [FN79]  The general intent construction fills an important regulatory function 
by lowering the government’s burden in prosecuting criminal cases.  The courts have upheld 
related challenges to environmental statutes against void for vagueness challenges under the Rule 
of Lenity. [FN80]
Early Fears: The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine Imposes Strict Liability
The addition of the RCO provision in the Clean Air Act led to panic that with the upgrade 
of criminal penalties to felonies coupled with increasingly aggressive enforcement of 
environmental violations by the EPA and the Department of Justice, [FN81] environmental 
violators would be facing strict liability crime. [FN82]  An alternate concern was the perception 
that innocent nonculpable corporate officials would be jailed for the vicarious liability of their 
employees, or be held strictly liable based solely on their status as corporate officers. [FN83]  One 
commentator stated plainly that the RCO doctrine was “simply strict liability applied.” [FN84]  
In fact, the Justice Department attempted to do just that, and use the reasoning in 
Dotterweich and Park to reduce or eliminate mens rea in prosecuting environmental crimes.    
9Keith Onsdorff, a former Director in the Office of Criminal Enforcement at the EPA, wrote an 
early influential article [FN85] in which he accused the Justice Department of attempting to 
circumvent RCRA’s “slender” knowledge requirement by using the RCO doctrine to hold 
corporate officers vicariously, or strictly liable for the actions of their employees. [FN86]  
Onsdorff’s and others’ fears proved to be unfounded—despite the DOJ’s attempts, the courts 
roundly rejected the application of either strict liability or a lowered mens rea requirement in the 
early interpretation of the RCO provision.  [FN87]
Early Cases: Frezzo Brothers and Johnson & Towers
U.S. v. Frezzo Bros., Inc.  
The responsible corporate officer doctrine was used in a prosecution under the CWA in 
Frezzo Bros. [FN88]  Although frequently cited as supporting the removal of the mens rea
requirement, Frezzo Bros. has more historical value, and is in fact singularly uninstructive on the 
application of the RCO doctrine.  The Frezzos’, Guido and James, were convicted of negligently 
or willfully discharging manure and compost from a holding tank into waterways of the U.S. in 
violation of the CWA. [FN89]  They appealed in part, arguing that they could not be prosecuted 
as individuals because the indictment charged them as corporate officers, and the jury 
instructions failed to mention this fact. [FN90] The court gave short shrift to the RCO doctrine, in 
a footnote no less, noting briefly in dicta that the brothers could be found guilty as individuals 
when the indictment charged them with acting as corporate officers. [FN91]  What was true was 
that there was considerable evidence that the Frezzos had actual knowledge of their illegal acts.  
United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.
Johnson & Towers, Inc. [FN92] is also valuable as an historical reference.  What is 
notable about Johnson & Towers is that the RCO doctrine was mentioned in a RCRA violation, 
and RCRA, unlike the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, does not contain the RCO provision.  
The court held that knowledge, including knowledge of the offense, “may be inferred by the jury 
as to those individuals who hold the requisite responsible positions with the corporate 
defendant…. Thus, while knowledge of prior illegal activity is not conclusive as to whether a 
defendant possessed the requisite knowledge of later illegal activity, it most certainly provides 
circumstantial evidence of the defendant's later knowledge from which the jury may draw the 
necessary inference.” [FN93]
Although this was dictum, Johnson & Towers recognized a concept that involved mens 
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rea, but not strict liability or a lowered mens rea requirement—that a corporate officer’s position 
could be used as circumstantial evidence of knowledge of a violation.
U.S. v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co. 
The first case that lead to the early fears that courts would begin to impose strict liability 
on corporate officers is U.S. v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co. [FN94] One of the 
defendants, Eugene D'Allesandro was charged with “knowingly” accepting hazardous waste 
containing toluene and soil contaminated with toluene without a permit in violation of RCRA § 
3008(d)(1) [FN 95] on two separate occasions, July 30 and 31, 1986.  At trial, the prosecution 
presented evidence that D’Allesandro was not simply the president but a “hands on manager” of 
a small corporation, with detailed knowledge of the day-to-day activities in the plant.  
D’Allesandro acknowledged that he had, on other occasions, accepted such shipments of 
contaminated waste that were outside the scope of his permit. [FN96] However, during the 
prosecution’s closing arguments, the prosecution conceded that the government had  “no direct 
evidence that … D'Allesandro actually knew that [those exact] shipments were coming in.”  
[FN97]  To prove intent, at the prosecution’s request the court instructed the jury if they could 
find that the government satisfied the “knowing” requirement based on D’Allesandro's position 
as a RCO, if the following were met: that he was a corporate officer, not merely an employee, 
that he had direct responsibility for the illegal activities, that the government proved that he had 
a responsibility to supervise the activities in question, and that he had “known or believed that 
the illegal activity of the type alleged occurred.”  [FN98] 
What the prosecution tried to establish was the knowledge requirement based solely on 
D’Allesandro’s status as a corporate officer.  But the First Circuit reversed the convictions, 
finding the instructions to be an error of law.  Park and Dotterweich were distinguishable, the 
court found, because RCRA, unlike the FDCA, explicitly required a mental state of knowingly—
and this intent requirement could not therefore be met solely through a showing that 
D’Allesandro was a corporate officer-- there was no demonstration of actual awareness, which 
the statute required. [FN 99]  The scienter requirement assumed added importance, the court 
found, not simply because Congressional intent was clear, and but also because the violation 
involved meaningful time in prison, from 5 years for the first offence, up to 10 years for the 
second. [FN100]  Although some courts have supported the idea that the misdemeanor/felony 
distinction would have no bearing on their decision about a mens rea requirement, MacDonald 
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& Watson clearly establishes that it does. [FN101]
U.S. v. White 
The second of these cases was U.S. v. White, [FN102] in which the court rejected a theory 
of respondeat superior, which would have expanded the RCO doctrine beyond strict liability.  In 
White, the U.S. charged one of the defendants, Steven Steed, in a Bill of Particulars as a 
“responsible corporate officer.”  [FN103]  According to the government’s theory, Steed was 
charged with constructive knowledge of his employees’ actions— as the corporate officer in 
charge of environmental safety he therefore either had knowledge of the violations, or should 
have known the violations had occurred.  [FN104]  The government tried to extend the doctrine of 
respondeat superior to include finding vicarious criminal liability through the actions of Steed’s 
employees.  
But again, as in MacDonald & Watson, the court refused to accept that the RCO doctrine 
could allow conviction without requisite intent required by RCRA. Congressional intent was 
clear: the “knowing” must be proven—it was not equal to the fact that the defendant “should 
have known.” [FN105]
U.S. v. Baytank, Inc. [FN106]
Onsdorff claims that in Baytank, the court implicitly applied what MacDonald & Watson 
found to be impermissible: the knowledge of a RCRA violation could be inferred from the 
defendant’s position as a corporate officer alone.  However, here too, the evidence was quite 
powerful beyond the defendants’ position that they possessed actual knowledge of the violations, 
and that their positions as responsible corporate officers was simply additional circumstantial 
proof.  Two of the defendants were high-ranking officers.  Johnsen, as Operations Manager, 
“had direct responsibility for most of the facility's day-to-day operations, including the filing of 
environmental compliance forms.”  Nordberg, the Executive Vice President, submitted permit 
applications to the EPA.  Testimony revealed that both had intimate knowledge of the facility 
and regularly dealt with thousands of gallons of illegally stored hazardous wastes. [FN107] 
U.S. v. Brittain
MacDonald & Watson, Baytank and White made clear that the courts would not impute 
knowledge to a corporate officer based solely on status.  All courts have rejected such an 
approach—currently there is no strict liability attached to the environmental statutes, nor will 
there likely be. [FN108]  A later case, U.S. v. Brittain, [FN109] is occasionally cited as authority to 
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the contrary, but again does not support the courts’ adoption of an altered mens rea under the 
RCO, except in dicta, and where the facts of the case clearly indicated actual knowledge and 
actual liability. [FN110]
Brittain was convicted of eighteen counts of falsely reporting material facts to a 
government agency, and two misdemeanor counts of discharging pollutants into the waters of the 
United States in violation of the CWA.  [FN111]  Brittain had argued that his conviction must be 
reversed based on insufficient evidence because the government failed to link the discharges to 
his willful or negligent conduct, claiming that the only evidence linking his knowledge of the 
discharges was based on his position in the company as a RCO.  [FN112]  The court commented:   
“…[a] responsible corporate officer," to be held criminally liable, would not have to "willfully or 
negligently" cause a permit violation. Instead, the willfulness or negligence of the actor would be 
imputed to him by virtue of his position of responsibility.”   
Brittain seems to strongly support the application of either a theory of respondeat
superior, or strict liability.  Again, however, it is important to note that Brittain’s consideration 
of the RCO doctrine was in dictum—there was considerable evidence linking Brittain to the 
willful discharges, and the conviction was based on actual knowledge, not on his position as a 
corporate officer. Brittain was aware that the plant had discharged sewage, he had personally 
observed the discharges, and that he told the plant supervisor to not report these to the EPA. 
[FN113]
Brittain does add to the RCO doctrine in one respect.  In considering the construction of 
the provision (noting that the CWA did not define the term, and that the “legislative history is 
silent regarding Congress's intention” [FN]) the court found that the addition of responsible 
corporate officers was intended to expand criminal liability, not, as Brittain had argued, limit it to 
permit holders.  [FN114]
Brittain demonstrates that critics were wrong with two predictions:  The RCO doctrine 
has not “been refined to is current state.” [FN115]  It did not then nor has it not now.  Second, the 
fear that the doctrine would be widely used to convict non-culpable parties, that it would impose 
either strict liability or a modified and lessened mens rea requirement, has not come to pass.  The 
courts’ rejection of a lowered mens rea under the RCO doctrine has been so complete, that one 
scholar argued that the RCO is a myth, simply finding its basis in dicta in a few opinions. [FN116]
This answers partly the question why the provision is not used more frequently. 
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Statute as the Source of Duty: Iverson, Ming Hong and the Evolution of the RCO Doctrine
Despite the rejection of the use of the RCO doctrine to modify or eliminate the mens rea
requirement, courts have accepted the RCO provision as one where the statute creates a duty 
when a corporate officer stands in a responsible relation to a public danger.  This theory is 
strongly supported in traditional criminal law and in Dotterweich and Parks.  What follows is a 
consideration of some of these cases, and how they have refined how the doctrine is used.  
U.S. v. Iverson [FN117] 
Iverson was the president and chairman of the board of CH2O, a company that blended 
chemicals to form various products such as acid cleaners and heavy-duty alkaline-based 
products.  The blending process involved mixing in drums.  The drums collected a waste residue 
that required cleaning; the cleaning produced wastewater with a high toxic metal content.  The 
city sewer authority informed Iverson that the metal content was too high to accept under their 
permit, and legal disposal of the wastewater was expensive—or more expensive than dumping it 
illegally. [FN118]  Beginning around 1985, Iverson personally ordered employees of CH2O to 
discharge the wastewater in three places, on the plant's property, through a sewer drain at an 
apartment complex that defendant owned, and through a sewer drain at defendant's home.  The 
original plant did not have sewer access.  Later, though, in 1992, CH2O purchased another 
facility that did have sewer access, which Iverson employed to dispose of the wastewater.  
Testimony revealed that Iverson was present during at least some of the discharges, where he 
could both see the discharges and smell the chemical odor. [FN119]
The district court instructed the jury that it could find Iverson guilty if he (1) had 
knowledge that employees were discharging the wastewater, (2) that he had the authority and the 
capacity to prevent the discharges and (3) that he failed to prevent the on-going discharges of 
pollutants to the sewer system. [FN120]
Iverson had argued that he could be held liable only if he actually exercised control of the 
activity, or if had the express corporate duty to do so.  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected 
Iverson’s narrow interpretation of an RCO doctrine, holding that under the CWA, “a person is a 
‘responsible corporate officer’ if the person has authority to exercise control over the 
corporation's activity that is causing the discharges. There is no requirement that the officer in 
fact exercise such authority or that the corporation expressly vest a duty in the officer to oversee 
the activity.”  [FN121]
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Iverson was a direct application of Parks as a violation of a statutory duty to prevent 
violations, although in this case it seemed hardly necessary, as the testimony established that 
Iverson had ordered the discharges.  However, Iverson is indicative of how the responsible 
officer would have the responsibility to report violations, especially when the knowledge is 
firsthand.  
United States v. Ming Hong [FN122]
Ming Hong adds an important detail that would otherwise limit application of the RCO 
doctrine, that is, that an officer need not be officially designated as one to be held liable.  In 
Ming Hong, employees of the Avion Corporation discharged untreated wastewater into the 
Richmond, Virginia sewer system in violation of its CWA permit.  Ming Hong had personally 
bought one filter designed as the final step in a longer treatment system, not as a complete filter 
system.  He knew this, and in addition, he was in charge of the company’s finances.  He had 
explicitly refused to authorize payment of filters, he knew that the filtration Avion had was 
inadequate under their permit conditions, and was regularly at the site when illegal discharges 
occurred.  [FN123]  Despite the fact that Hong went to “great lengths” to shield his connection 
with Avion in an obvious attempt to avoid culpability, [FN124] the court found that he was the de 
facto owner, that he exercised substantial control over the discharges and was therefore 
criminally liable. [FN125]
 Hong argued that the government was required to prove that he was a responsible 
corporate officer because the information charged him as such, and that even if no proof was 
required, the U.S. “failed to prove that he exerted sufficient control over operations [of Avion, 
the corporation], or that he had authority to prevent the illegal discharges … to be held 
responsible for the discharges” that were the basis of the charges. [FN126]  The court found that 
the gravamen” of liability as a RCO was not a formal designation as such, but, relying on the 
principles articulated in Park, whether the defendant “bore a responsible relationship to the 
violation” where it was “appropriate” to hold him liable.  [FN127] 
Ming Hong is perhaps the clearest application of the statute creating a duty.  Hong was 
very clearly aware of the regulations requiring the permit, and he had the means and the 
authority to comply with its terms.  
Responsible Corporate Officers: Circumstantial Proof of Mens rea
U.S. v. Self [FN128]
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Although rejecting the lowered mens rea requirement, the responsible corporate officer 
doctrine can be used as circumstantial, or supplemental evidence to establish guilty knowledge.  
Self argued that he was convicted based on his status as a RCO, like the defendant in MacDonald 
& Watson. [FN129] But the Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, finding an important 
distinction: the error in MacDonald & Watson was erroneous jury instructions, in which the 
court held that it was impermissible to infer knowledge based on status as a RCO alone.  [FN130]  
Self , in comparison, dealt with sufficiency of the evidence.  [FN131] MacDonald & Watson
acknowledged what is of course common in criminal cases, that mens rea may be inferred from 
circumstantial evidence—here by using the RCO doctrine.  [FN132] Still, at no time did the court 
believe that the mens rea was less simply by virtue of Self’s position. The court held that the 
evidence was sufficient; the defendant had knowledge of prior illegal storage, he had solicited 
shipments; also, the facility's vice-president and an employee testified that the defendant directed 
storage of hazardous waste in violation of RCRA.  [FN133] The RCO doctrine cemented that this 
knowledge was not coincidence. 
Willful Blindness: U.S. v. Hopkins [FN134]
Hopkins gives some indication of how the RCO might be used in a conscious avoidance 
or “willful blindness” instruction.  “Conscious-avoidance charge is appropriate when (a) the 
element of knowledge is in dispute, and (b) the evidence would permit a rational juror to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt ‘that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the 
fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact.’”  [FN135]  The court stressed that 
willful blindness instructions were an appropriate means argue in the alternative—that the 
defendant had actual knowledge, or if “the defendant lacked such knowledge it was only because 
he had studiously sought to avoid knowing what was plain.”  [FN136]  In this case, Hopkins was 
the vice president of Spirol, a company that manufactured zinc plated products.  The plating 
process produced large amounts of toxic wastewater, and Hopkins was responsible for 
monitoring the wastewater and filing monthly discharge reports with the state’s Department of 
Environmental Protection.  Hopkins would wait until his subordinates presented him with reports 
that contained acceptable levels.  In what one can only imagine was Hopkins’ best Sergeant 
Schultz imitation (Hogan’s Heroes), Hopkins would respond, “I know nothing, I hear nothing.”  
[FN137]  Although the RCO doctrine was not used explicitly, Hopkins position as vice-president, 
and his explicit duty to monitor and file the reports might have been more of a factor had the 
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evidence of Hopkins guilt been less compelling.  [FN138]
PART IV
THE DORMANT PROVISION
The DOJ has achieved a 95% conviction rate in the prosecution of environmental crimes.  
Over 80% of these convictions involved corporate officers.  [FN139]  Several states have adopted 
similar RCO provisions in their environmental statutes, with identical language as in Clean Air 
and Clean Water Acts, [FN140] yet despite the addition there is a notable absence of criminal 
convictions in state cases, although many states use the doctrine as a duty creating provision in 
the civil context, following Park and Dotterweich.  [FN141] States have reached the same results 
as in federal courts in rejecting strict liability.  
There are no reported cases to date using the RCO provision in a state criminal 
environmental case. The RCO provision seldom plays a role in environmental criminal 
prosecutions involving both state and federal law.  The question is why? 
An obvious answer may be the courts’ rejection of the RCO doctrine as reducing or 
modifying the mens rea requirement.  Related to this may be that the Environmental Crimes 
Section (ECS), which prosecutes environmental crimes at the Department of Justice, has too few 
resources to cover the entire country to argue a theory perceived to be vague and has received 
mixed treatment in the courts.  
Yet another reason may lay in the fact that the government can prosecute environmental 
crimes under a conspiracy theory, and by applying Pinkerton liability.  Once the underlying 
violation is established, a criminal co-conspirator is liable for all the substantive crimes 
committed during the course of and in the furtherance of the conspiracy that are reasonably 
foreseeable. [FN142] Additionally, the government can charge an individual under any of the 
appellations listed in § 302(e), which include corporate officers, agents, and employees.  
Other reasons and an area of concern in the criminal enforcement program are that 
prosecutors tend to react to violations rather than actively seek them out, relying on 
whistleblowers to find and investigate cases.  While whistleblowers can be a valuable resource, 
but is not an effective way to find and prosecute the most serious violations. [FN143]  Related to 
the procedure of how the Department of Justice learns of criminal violations is how enforcement 
is actually done, by “ratcheting up” violations from administrative penalties, to civil penalties, 
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and then finally into criminal prosecutions, [FN144] which perhaps give RCOs the opportunity to 
get “off the hook.”  
There are reasons particular to the CAA of why the RCO doctrine is not used more often, 
and why there are few prosecutions under the CAA generally: proving violations is notoriously 
difficult, simply by the nature of the “gone with the wind” evidence. [FN145]  Another reason for 
few prosecutions is that the CAA allows for an exemption for “accidents;” emission violations 
that are not “reasonably foreseeable,” [FN146] even though, as one commentator noted, these 
accidents frequently occur in the same factories again and again.  [FN147]  Even when evidence 
of these unlawful emissions is available, the violations under the CAA are measured in days, not 
in amounts or levels or toxicity, which significantly lower the dollar amount. [FN148]  This lack 
of cost benefit may influence the decision to prosecute.  The cumulative effect of these all these 
make violators difficult to target.
The Dormant Provision: Is the RCO Doctrine A Benefit?  
What effect does having the dormant RCO provision in the statute have on industry?  If it 
is unused, should it remain in the statute, or does the RCO provision further the goals of 
environmental regulation?  If so, how could the legislature amend the RCO provision to improve 
this function? 
Should the RCO Doctrine Be Used in Criminal Prosecutions?  Blurring the Line Between 
Tort and Criminal
One of the criticisms of applying the RCO doctrine in environmental criminal law is a 
general one-- environmental criminal statutes, as applied, do not comport with traditional 
criminal law norms.  [FN149]  The foundation of this criticism is that environmental statutes such 
as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts (and of course other environmental statues) overlay their 
criminal and civil provisions: a violation of any one is either civil or criminal, with the mental 
state of “knowingly” dividing the two. [FN150]  Some provisions have “negligent” as a mental 
state. [FN151]  While the dividing line between tort and criminal law is usually well defined in 
traditional law, the argument runs that environmental law has distinctive characteristics: its 
aspirational quality, a high degree of complexity, and its indeterminacy.  [FN152]  These 
distinctive qualities blur the between tortious and criminal conduct in environmental statutes. 
Environmental Law’s Distinctive Features
Richard Lazarus, a professor at Georgetown University, describes how three of these 
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distinctive features of environmental law need to be taken into consideration when making 
environmental criminal policy. The first of these is that environmental law is aspirational: 
environmental law seeks goals that it knows are not immediately obtainable.  For example, the 
Clean Air Act sought attainment of national ambient air quality standards by 1975—goals that 
have yet to be achieved even today in year 2004.  Similarly, the CWA had a goal of swimmable 
waters by 1983, and zero discharges of pollutants into the nation’s waterways by 1985. [FN153]  
Environmental law is lends itself to indeterminacy—it is “evolutionary and dynamic” in nature—
it is constantly responding to advancements in science and technology, and evolving to our 
understanding of the environment itself.  The law constantly adapts to reflect these changes.  
These constantly changing standards, and the change in conduct they require, make the 
duty a corporate officer must fulfill too indeterminate to apply criminal law, because it provides 
no set guidelines by which to judge criminal behavior. [FN154]  And of course, added to this 
indeterminacy is environmental law’s inherent complexity.  [FN155]  It is therefore easy to 
engage in conduct that is criminal without culpability.  
Traditional criminal law, in comparison, is based on a fixed set of societal norms based 
on a common and largely static understanding of moral values.  Rape, murder, theft, are morally 
wrong, and of course have been since “time out of mind.”  Criminal law requires these readily 
identifiable codes of conduct to justify the harsh sanctions of incarceration and large monetary 
penalties, whereas environmental law is anything but that, with its dynamic, changing character, 
highly technical standards, and incomprehensible complexity.  Criminal law is therefore more 
appropriate for “addressing absolute duties,” whereas tort law is better suited for addressing 
“relative duties.” [FN156] The RCO doctrine of course plays into this—at least, its perception, in 
that responsible corporate officers have a duty, but what that duty is may not always be clear.
When there is no clear duty for the responsible corporate officer to fill, and when the 
conduct is not clearly identifiable as criminal, criminal enforcement, with the “full moral force of 
the law” behind it, is inappropriate.  Further, policy makers and the legislature have not 
considered these important differences in enacting criminal provisions.  [FN157].   The result is 
that “this blurring of the border between tort and crime predictably will result in injustice, and 
ultimately will weaken the efficacy of the criminal law as an instrument of social control,” 
[FN158] evidenced by the application of a negligence standard in some statutes.” [FN159]
Enforcement Policy of the Department of Justice  
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Lazarus and others argue further that the blurred line gives prosecutors too wide a 
discretion in enforcement decisions, [FN160] and that such “ad hoc” prosecutorial decisions are 
“subjective and impressionistic,” and cannot be relied on to promote consistency and fairness.”  
[FN161]    
The Department of Justice has guidelines describing how and when they will prosecute as 
environmental crimes, [FN162] guidelines designed to further the regulatory program by 
encouraging voluntary compliance, cooperation, and adequate training.  The Department’s stated 
policy is to seek the “highest culpable party in the corporate organization to target for criminal 
violations.”  [FN163]  
While these rules offer guidelines on how the Department bases its decisions to prosecute 
(considering factors such as the level of risk to the public, public health impacts, whether the 
violation is “technical,” deliberate and blatant failures to obtain permits, false statements, and the 
level of cooperation, etc. [FN164]) this does little to define what kinds of conduct or acts form the 
line between civil and criminal violations, adding to a perception of arbitrariness and unfairness. 
While guidelines clarify enforcement policy, as one commentator points out, it still “begs the 
question” of where the dividing line lies— and whether we trust prosecutors to honor these lines.  
[FN165] 
Brickey’s Response—the Intersection of Criminal and Environmental Law
If Lazarus’ and others’ criticisms are valid, then the RCO doctrine should not be used in 
the enforcement of criminal law.  If a corporate officer’s duties are not clearly defined, then 
criminal enforcement of a violation based on an unclear duty is inappropriate and unfair.
However, not all critics agree with this assessment.  Kathleen Brickey has found a much 
closer “fit” in her evaluation of the intersection between environmental criminal theory and 
traditional criminal law.  She argues that environmental criminal provisions do create clear, 
straightforward duties, and that is there no unfairness in judging those knowing failures to fulfill 
those duties as criminal.  [FN166]  If Brickey is correct, then using the RCO doctrine could be an 
important tool for ensuring corporate compliance, as link in chain that could ensure corporate 
responsibility for environmental violations. [FN167]
Administrative and Substantive Environmental Crimes
Brickey’s argument centers on what she believes is a mistaken perception of 
environmental law is a “monolithic,” uniform body.  [FN168]  She analyses how environmental 
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criminal enforcement is actually applied, finding that they are an appropriate application of 
traditional criminal law. [FN169]
The crux of Brickey’s analysis is that she divides environmental violations crimes into 
two groups—substantive and administrative.  Substantive environmental crimes are those that 
involve direct harm or risk of harm to the environment.  They usually involve illegal discharges 
or emissions, or the risk creating activity of illegal storage in violation of RCRA. [FN170] 
Administrative crimes are those that interfere with the information exchange between the 
government and industry-- monitoring and reporting requirements.  These would include failures 
to properly monitor, false reporting of emissions, failures to notify when emissions or discharges 
exceed legally established limits.  Permit violations are a hybrid, and can involve both 
substantive and administrative violations.  Failure to obtain a permit when one would be issued 
would be an administrative violation, whereas the failure to obtain a permit that would not be 
granted is a substantive violation.  
When environmental law is broken down into these categories, and evaluated in a 
traditional criminal law context, there is a much closer fit between environmental and criminal 
law theory.  One of the most persuasive examples she offers is found in the identical provisions 
in the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts which criminalize “knowingly making false statements” 
in reporting document. [FN171]  Requiring a corporate officer to make accurate statements is not 
influence by environmental law’s “aspirational quality.”  Rather, this provision, and others like it 
involve an unchanging, “elementary standards of conduct.”  This area of law is not “dynamic and 
evolutionary, but, as she states, is “static, and unchanging, as old as the basic tenant,  ‘thou shalt 
not lie.”  [FN172]
The statute thus establishes the duty is very clearly, not subject to environmental law’s 
distinctive characteristics.  She finds that similarly, criminal violations of substantive 
environmental law is not inherently unfair—the application of a mens rea requirement leads to 
predictable outcomes, not ones that are unfair or unwittingly put the innocent in jail.  She 
identifies the permits process as a classic example, which create equally identifiable standards of 
conduct, which operate as a covenant between the government and the polluter to define the 
terms by which they can pollute.  [FN]  It cannot be seen as unfair to prosecute those who have 
full notice of the standard.  [FN173]  
U.S. v. Weintraub [FN174] illustrates Brickey’s point well.  Weintraub was a Connecticut 
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real estate developer who purchased office building in New Haven, which he planned to renovate 
into apartment buildings.  The city provided Weintraub with a report describing considerable 
amounts of asbestos in the building.  The work procedures for asbestos removal fill hundreds if 
not thousands of pages of the Federal Register, and contain detailed work practice standards for 
removal in demolition and construction, elaborate descriptions of when asbestos becomes 
“friable,” that is, when it turns to dust that poses a threat to the public. [FN175]  Friability 
determinations are made using complex applications of “Polarized Light Microscopy.”  While 
the underlying science and policy were complex, indeterminate, and aspirational, Weintraub was 
aware of asbestos in the building and he was aware that asbestos removal required specialized 
licensed removers. [FN176]  At one point, during the demolition, the EPA even warned 
Weintraub that his company was under investigation, but the illegal disposals continued.  [FN177]  
The standard of conduct was clear, and he chose to violate it.  
Another sample of how identifiable the standards of conduct are in environmental 
regulation is found in U.S. v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,  [FN178]  which describes a process in which 
the a responsible corporate officer is required to ensure the accuracy of monitoring reports.  
“Under the Clean Water Act, each permittee must establish and maintain records, install and use 
monitoring equipment, sample its effluent according to a prescribed schedule and report the 
results to the permitting agency…. The effluent reports, which are submitted on standard EPA 
prescribed forms, are known as Discharge Monitoring Reports…. A permittee's Discharge 
Monitoring Reports must be signed by a ‘responsible corporate officer’ or duly authorized 
representative, who certifies that the reported information was prepared by qualified personnel 
under his or her direction or supervision, and that the information is true, accurate and complete.   
Accuracy is further encouraged by the availability of criminal penalties for false statements.”). 
[FN179]
Links to Traditional Criminal Law: Deterrence.
Failure to fulfill a duty created by statute is the basis for criminal and tort liability, and 
has longstanding and wide acceptance by the courts. [FN180]  The effect of the RCO doctrine can 
and should be to codify a corporate officer’s duty to ensure greater compliance, accuracy in 
monitoring and reporting, and to deter violations by ensuring corporate accountability. [FN181]  If 
Brickey’s analysis is valid, then these duties are not abstract, but are based on “static and 
unchanging” standards of conduct.  [FN182]  As a former Chief of the Environmental Crimes 
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Section once said, “the crimes we prosecute for involve conduct my five year old daughter would 
know was wrong.” [FN183] 
The threat of criminal sanctions fills the gaps in the regulatory system-- there is strong 
correlation between aggressive criminal enforcement programs and corporate decisions to 
implement environmental compliance and management programs. [FN184]  Corporate executives 
identify possibility of criminal sanctions as the number one reason for implementing 
environmental compliance programs.  [FN185]  The value cannot be underestimated, because 
there are simply not enough inspectors to ensure detection of all violations. [FN186]
Deterrence assumes another vital role when the economic incentives to violate 
regulations are great.  Compliance with environmental regulations can be prohibitively expensive 
to many companies, especially where the profit margin is not large.  When monetary penalties 
from crimes are not much greater than compliance, polluters will risk the “prosecution lottery.” 
[FN187]  The possibility of jail time then assumes an added importance, because “jailtime is one 
cost that cannot be passed onto consumers.” Criminal sanctions thus act to “level the playing 
field,” so that fewer will gain an economic advantage by violating.  [FN188]  Without criminal 
sanctions, industry could simply accept the monetary penalties as the cost of doing business, 
which could then be passed on to consumers.  Enforcement acts as incentive to comply, and to 
not put those who do comply at a competitive disadvantage.  
Deterrence Value: Inadequate Monitoring
Deterrence has added importance in the context of the Clean Air Act.  EPA inspection of 
environmental standards is spread thinly throughout the country.  [FN189]  In recent testimony 
before the U.S. Senate, Eric Schaeffer, former Director of the EPA’s Office of Regulatory 
Enforcement reported that CAA emissions were notoriously difficult to monitor accurately, and 
that the EPA will assume compliance, when in fact, there is none. [FN190]  EPA inspections of 
emission sources are limited.  Often, EPA must rely on periodic samplings of thousands of sites 
that might occur as little as every three or four years.  [FN191]  A GAO report found that emission 
factors were “often wrong by an order of magnitude.” These include carcinogens from refineries 
can often be five times higher than the reported industry estimates. [FN192]  
Another problem peculiar to the Clean Air Act is the nature of so-called “fugitive 
emissions.” These are leaks from refineries of smog forming volatile organic compounds from 
valves, flanges, and pumps, and are more difficult to monitor than the smokestack emissions.  
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One EPA official called the monitoring of these emissions pure guesswork. [FN193]  Clean Air 
Act policy can then based on data that do not “accurately reflect reality” when based on 
inaccurate reporting. 
Link to Culpability 
Another important link between traditional criminal law and environmental criminal law 
and the RCO doctrine is one of culpability—that traditional criminal law punishes culpable 
conduct. [FN194]  Culpability is “the societal judgment that the actor is not only responsible for 
harmful conduct, but is blameworthy as well, is an act of legal line-drawing. This is the pivotal 
juncture where the law of tort and the criminal law diverge, and what were once deemed mere 
bad acts are transformed into crimes.”  [FN195] 
It is a misperception to see environmental violations as mere economic crimes, or to 
ignore, or see minimum culpability of a violator’s behavior.  [FN196]  Violators do not only harm 
the economy by gaining an unfair competitive advantage.  To a much greater degree than 
traditional crimes, criminal violations of environmental laws have the ability to affect large 
populations, as the incidents at Bhopal and the Prince William Sound illustrate.  Although these 
two incidents resulted in immediate and palpable harms, and were scrutinized by the public, 
more often environmental violations result in enduring and continuing harms—residue of wastes, 
slow and persistent leaks-- and the harm is hidden; though the risks continue over time. [FN197]
Hidden harms occur frequently in Clean Air Act violations, as breathing is a common 
activity, and where violations are simply never reported, or labeled as accidents. [FN198]  The 
potential for violators to cause disease without detection can never be adequately calculated.  
The deterrent value of aggressive enforcement of environmental statutes then becomes critical.  
PART IV
CONCLUSION AND
SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS
How could the provision be improved?  A source of confusion over the past 20 years of 
case law and commentary has been how the provision can and should be applied.  As a starting 
point, one suggestion that the statutes should explicitly adopt the most important holdings in the 
leading decisions, which are recognized applications of traditional criminal law.  First, that the 
statute creates an affirmative duty for RCOs to seek out and prevent violations, and that a 
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knowing failure to fulfill that duty is a criminal act.  The public is demanding increased corporate 
accountability in all areas. [FN199]  The recent enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act [FN200] is 
indicative of this trend.  Sarbanes-Oxley imposes a statutory duty on auditors to report violations 
of accounting laws—the public has a right to expect no less of a corporation’s environmental 
reporting duties.
Kathleen Brickey has identified how clear these duties are: sign reports honestly and 
accurately.  Notify the EPA of substantive violations, as permits require.  Most violations of 
environmental criminal laws involve such “elementary standards” of conduct. [FN201]
However, the concerns that Lazarus and others have voiced are valid: to be a criminal 
violation, the duty on a corporate officer must be unmistakably clear.  What is true in the case 
law is the no responsible corporate officer has been sent to prison under a “technical violation,” 
but the statute could also reflect a better clarity.  One possibility would shift what are the Justice 
Department’s guidelines on how to identify criminal behavior to the statute to determine what 
level of care is to be expected from a responsible corporate officer.  These would include an 
increased duty and culpability when the substances involved are hazardous, when the industry 
violates repeatedly, taking into account what are known as “bad actor” provisions—multiple 
cases of “accidents” being proof of breaching a duty of care the industry’s level of cooperation 
and compliance, and employee training programs.  Such changes would appropriate shift the 
prosecutor defining what is criminal, to the statute itself.  
The legislature could also adopt the holding in Self and other decisions, that the officer’s 
position can be used circumstantial proof of knowledge of the violations.  Criticisms here are 
well taken, and the courts have responded that there is nor should there be a strict liability or 
lowered mens rea requirement.  
 Finally, the Court in Parks noted that the duty is high when public safety is involved, but 
that the duty does not require what is impossible. [FN202]  If the RCO provision is used, the 
statute could again explicitly recognize the affirmative defense outlined in Parks, that a 
defendant was ‘powerless’ to prevent or correct the violation….” The lessons from Dotterweich 
and Park are still valid.  Corporations who expose a helpless public to large-scale risks have a 
duty to protect against those risks.  Central to idea of public welfare offenses is the notion that 
the corporation is run by individuals—someone must be in charge.  The RCO doctrine helps to 
ensure that someone in fact is in responsible by codifying this duty and holding those in the best 
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position to prevent harm responsible.  “The ‘responsible relationship’ the person might have to
these activities may vary from being the plant manager who was at his office, the vessel captain 
who was in his cabin, or the corporate president in his office hundreds of miles from where the 
act occurred,” but someone must and should be held accountable.  [FN203]  Fulfilling that duty is, 
in the Court’s words, no more than we have a right to expect.  
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(reporting that in a 1986 Department of Justice poll of public attitudes toward crime, respondents 
ranked environmental crime seventh in importance).  
FN28 Congress added criminal penalties to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) at § 103(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1988) (criminal 
sanctions for failure to notify; use of notice or information pursuant to notice in criminal case); to 
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (§ 3009-1(a), 42 U.S.C. § 300h-2(b) (1988)) (criminal 
penalties for “willful violations); Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 
2615(b) (1988); Federal Insecticide Fungicide & Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) § 14(b), 7 U.S.C. § 
136l(b) (1988); Endangered Species Act (ESA) § 11(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b) (1988).
Congress added more criminal penalty sections to the Clean Water Act in the 1990 Amendments.  
§ 309(c) provides for enhanced penalties.  S. REP. 101-94, 23, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 745.  
(“Section 206(b) affirms recent court decisions to explicitly provide that violations of the 
prohibition on discharge of oil and hazardous substances are subject to the criminal penalties 
established under § 309 of the Act. These penalties are $2,500-$25,000/1 year for negligent 
violations, $5,000- $50,000/3 years for knowing violations, and up to $250,000 and 15 years for 
knowing endangerment. This amendment is intended to resolve any ambiguity concerning the 
intent of Congress on this question.”). 
FN29  Pub. L. No. 101-549 §§103-109 Stat. 2399 (1990).  The list of criteria pollutants is SO2, 
PM10, CO, Ozone, NOx and Lead. This list will be expanded. One of the requirements of the 
1990 amendments is the evaluation of the oxides of nitrogen and effect of volatile organic 
carbons as precursors of Ozone.
FN30 Some of the Clean Air Act’s criminal provisions include: § 113(c)(2), which imposes 
criminal liability on “any person” who “knowingly” makes a false material statement, fails to 
pay fees, or fails to notify or report as required in the Act.  Paragraph (c)(4) has a lowered mens 
rea of “negligently” for releases of hazardous air pollutants listed under § 7412 that places a 
person in “imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury,” with a maximum sentence of one 
year, with a five year penalty if the release is done “knowingly.”  
FN31 CAA § 113(c)(2)(C); 42 U.S.C. 7413(c)(2)(C).  Additionally, violators are subject to the 
28
sometimes harsh effects of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  See Judson W. Starr & Thomas J. 
Kelly, Jr., Environmental Crimes and Sentencing Guidelines: The Time Has Come . . . And It is 
Hard Time, 20 Envtl.L.Rep. (Envt’l L.Inst.) 10096 (1990) (analysis of the impacts and 
mechanics of the guidelines).
FN32 CAA § 113(c)(5); 42 U.S.C. 7413(c)(5).  See generally John Gibson, The Crime of 
Knowing Endangerment Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Is It More “Bark Than 
Bite” As A Watchdog To Help Safeguard A Workplace Free From Life-Threatening Hazardous 
Air Pollutant Releases?, 6 Ford. Envt’l L. J. 197 (1995).  The “knowing endangerment” 
provisions in the Clean Air Act have limited usefulness in protecting worker safety due to the 
addition of ambiguous legal terms such as “willful” and “into the ambient air” raising the burden 
of proof on prosecutors.    
FN33 See, e.g., U.S. v. Shurelds, 173 F.3d 430, at *2-3 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished opinion) 
(discussing “normal activities” of employees under §113(h)).  The Sixth Circuit rejected a void 
vagueness challenge to §113(h).  The defendant, one Shurelds, contended that the Clean Air Act 
that had conflicting mental state requirements: § 113(c)(1) requires “knowingly,” while (h) 
required “knowing and willfully” as a mental state.  The court found that exceptions contained in 
criminal provisions are normally construed as affirmative defenses.  
FN34  CAA 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1990).
FN35 U.S. v. Itzkowitz, 1998 WL 812573 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying the “substantial control” 
standard in finding defendant an operator under § 113(h) of the CAA.   
FN36 CAA § 113(h), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(h).  
FN37 See U.S. v. Pearson, 274 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2001).  Pearson was charged with 
knowingly causing removal of asbestos containing material without complying with applicable 
work practice standards in violation of the Clean Air Act § 113(c)(1); 42 U.S.C. §7413(c)(1).   
Pearson had instructed employees to use less than appropriate amounts of water on the asbestos 
(a prevention measure to prevent the accumulation of particulate matter), and had performed the 
work using clogged ventilation machines.  The court held that a person could be both an 
employee and a supervisor under CAA.  The standard for liability as a supervisor is higher than 
that of a RCO— the supervisor must have exercised “substantial control” in the workplace and 
over workplace procedures.  Id. (citing United States v. Walsh, 8 F.3d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 
1993)). “Under the CAA, a defendant need not possess ultimate, maximal, or preeminent control 
over the actual asbestos abatement work practices. Significant and substantial control means 
having the ability to direct the manner in which work is performed and the authority to correct 
problems. … On any given asbestos abatement project there could be one or more supervisors. 
The term ‘supervisor’ is not limited to the individual with the highest authority.”
FN38 CAA § 113(c)(6), 42 U.S.C. s 7413(c)(6).  
FN39 CWA §309(c)(6); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319.  
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FN40 See U.S. v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1414 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting Congress’ near silence 
on the subject).  
FN41 Report of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, U.S. Senate Report No. 95-
127, 51.  
FN42 See, e.g., U.S. v. George, 266 F.3d 52, 62 (2nd Cir. 2001).  
FN 43 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (“Congress' repetition of a well-established 
term carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with 
pre-existing ... interpretations.”). 
FN44 U.S. v. Park, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
FN45 U.S. v. Dotterweich, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).  
FN46 Note that the public welfare offenses, the basis of the responsible corporate officer doctrine, 
is older still.  See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922) (“the emphasis of… [public 
welfare statutes] is evidently upon achievement of some social betterment rather than the 
punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se.” (citing cases)).  
FN47 Dotterweich at 278.
FN48 Id.; FDCA § 301(a), 21 U.S.C. § 331(a), (k). 
FN49 Dotterweich at 280.
FN 50 Id. at 280-81. 
FN51 Id.
FN52 Id.
FN53 Id.
FN54 Id. at 281. 
FN55 U.S. v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).  
FN56 Id. at 660.  
FN57 Id.
FN58 Id.
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FN59 Id. at 663 n. 6.  
FN60 Id. at 663-64. 
FN61 Id. at 664. 
FN62 Id. at 672. 
FN63 See FN59.
FN64 Park, 421 U.S. at n. 16
FN65 Id. at 673- 674.
FN66 Id. 
FN 67 Susan F. Mandiberg & Susan L. Smith, CRIMES AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT, § 8-2(b)(3)(i) 
(Michie 1997) (hereinafter CRIMES AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT). 
FN68 See id. at §3-3(a) n. 25 (citing U.S. v. Washington Power Co., 793 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 
1985); Carolene Products Co. v. U.S., 140 F.2d 61, 66 (4th Cir. 1944) (“There is ample authority 
in support of the principle that the directing heads of a corporation which is engaged in an 
unlawful business may be held criminally liable for the acts of subordinates done in the normal 
course of business, regardless of whether or not these directing heads personally supervised the 
particular acts done or were personally present at the time and place of the commission of these 
acts.”). 
FN69 Id. 
FN70 Id. (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (statute incriminating 
“vagrancy” was unconstitutionally vague); and Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) 
(reversing conviction for status as “drug addict”).  
FN71 Id. 
FN72 Id.
FN73 CAA § 113(c)(2); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413. “Any person who knowingly (A) makes any false 
material statement, representation, or certification in, or omits material information from, or 
knowingly alters, conceals, or fails to file or maintain any notice, application, record, report, 
plan, or other document required pursuant to this chapter to be either filed or maintained 
(whether with respect to the requirements imposed by the Administrator or by a State); (B) fails 
to notify or report as required under this chapter; or (C) falsifies, tampers with, renders 
inaccurate, or fails to install any monitoring device or method required to be maintained or 
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followed under this chapter.” 
FN74 See, e.g., id. at § 113(c)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) (providing felony penalties for knowing 
violations).  
FN75 U.S. v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386 (5th Cir. 1996).  This decision is widely regarded as an 
aberration.  See Thomas Richard Uiselt, What A Criminal Needs To Know Under Section 
309(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act: How Far Does Knowingly Travel, 8 Envt’l L. 303, 331 (2002).  
This issue is by far from over, though apparently.  See generally id.
FN76 United States v. Weintraub, 273 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.2001) held that the government satisfies 
the knowledge element for purposes of a conviction under the Clean Air Act if it proves that “the 
defendant knew that the substance involved in the alleged violations was asbestos.”  Accord U.S. 
v. Hunter, 193 F.R.D. 62 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); “Public welfare offenses are not to be construed to 
require proof that the defendant knew he was violating the law in the absence of clear evidence 
of contrary congressional intent.”  United States v. Weitzenhoff, 1 F.3d 1523, 1529 (9th Cir.), 
reh'g denied and amended 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993). Staples v. U.S., 511 U.S. 600, 618 
(1994) is instructive as the Supreme Court explains the analysis of what constitutes a public 
welfare offense—knowledge that a reasonable person would know that the substance or product 
is the subject of regulation.  Except for the Fifth Circuit in Ahmad (see FN70, supra) courts have 
generally agreed that violations of the Clean Air Act and other environmental statutes are public 
welfare statutes and therefore not specific intent crimes—in other words, no showing that the 
violator was aware she was breaking the law, supported by the maxim, “ignorance of the law is 
not a defense.”  Courts have generally followed Weitzenhoff.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 
533, 540 (2d Cir. 1995), U.S. v. Phillips, 2004 WL 193258 (9th Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Fiorillo, 186 
F.3d 1136, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 1999).  Phillips, as earlier cases, rejected what it construed as a due 
process argument that the Clean Water Act required a mental state of willful to be a violation.  
Interestingly, the court noted that no finding of aquatic harm was necessary to find a criminal 
violation—such matters were properly left to sentencing considerations.  Id. at *2.  See also U.S. 
v. Goldsmith, 978 F.2d 643, 645 (11th Cir. 1992) (the government need only prove the defendant 
had knowledge of the general hazardous character of the materials to be found liable).
FN77 See generally FN75 and cases cited.
FN78 U.S. v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157 F.3d 432, 439 n. 3 (6th Cir. 1998).
FN79 U.S.  v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971) (“Where . . . dangerous or 
deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of 
regulation is so great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with 
them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation.”).  
FN80 U.S. v. Kelley Technical Coatings, Inc., 157 F.3d 432, 439 n. 3 (6th Cir. 1998) “Defendants 
contend that RCRA is "gravely ambiguous" and requires application of the rule of lenity and an 
interpretation of the statute that requires proof of knowledge of illegality. Under the rule of lenity 
"an ambiguous criminal statute is to be construed in favor of the accused… This maxim of 
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construction, however, is not lightly applied. It is inapplicable unless there is a "grievous 
ambiguity or uncertainty" in the statute…. There is no such grievous ambiguity in RCRA, as 
demonstrated by the analysis in Dean.  Accordingly, we reject Defendants' argument for 
application of the rule of lenity.”  
FN81 Prosecutions for environmental crimes rise every year, with increasing longer prison 
sentences and higher monetary penalties.  “In fact, since the beginning of 1983 until December 
13, 1995, the Department of Justice …has recorded environmental criminal indictments against 
1,674 corporate and individual defendants and 1,176 guilty pleas and convictions. Recorded as of 
September 29, 1995, nearly $309 million in criminal penalties were assessed (this number 
includes federal and state restitutions and known costs for remediation) and 517 years of 
imprisonment imposed (374 of which account for actual confinement).  Memorandum from 
Peggy Hutchins, Paralegal to Ronald A. Sarachan, Chief, Environmental Crimes Section (Mar. 
19, 1996) (cited in Sean Bellew, Daniel T. Kurz, Criminal Enforcement Of Environmental Laws: 
A Corporate Guide To Avoiding Liability, 8 Vill. Envt'l L.J. 205, 205 (1997)); Professor Coffee 
noted an increasingly aggressive EPA policy of enforcing criminal provisions, prophesizing 
other agencies would follow. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: 
Reflections On The Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction In American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193,
217- 218 (March 1991). 
The Environmental Crimes Section (ECS) of the Department of Justice in 2003 does not 
reveal its enforcement policies, and would not answer questions about why the responsible 
corporate officer provision is not used more often.  The refusal may also have been because the 
ECS was sharply criticized in the 1990s for mismanagement and incompetence.  “Despite its 
apparent numerical success, the Justice Department’s criminal-enforcement record is plagued by 
political controversy. Spearheaded by Representative John Dingell, whose Subcommittee on 
Investigations and Oversight of the House Energy and Commerce Committee held extensive 
hearings in 1992 and 1993, critics challenged the rigor of the criminal- enforcement program by 
questioning the Department’s judgment in declining to prosecute seemingly strong cases 
(sometimes over strenuous objections from line prosecutors); its apparently deferential treatment 
of powerful corporations and their executives; its holding of closed-door meetings with defense 
lawyers without informing EPA officials or the United States Attorney’s office; and its “ready 
agreement to trivial financial penalties in cases involving serious and long-standing 
environmental violations.” Kathleen Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The 
Intersection of Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 Tul. L.Rev. 487, 490 (Dec. 1996). 
FN82 See, e.g., Peter M. Gillon and Steven L. Humphreys, Corporate Officer Liability Under 
Clean Air Act May Create Disincentives, 6 NO. 5 Inside Litig. 6, 6 (1992).  “The RCO doctrine 
is a useful tool in EPA’s campaign against corporate violators.  The doctrine circumvents the 
knowledge requirement of environmental statutes by imposing vicarious criminal liability upon 
CEOs for the environmental violations of their subordinates.  Although this approach seems to 
be a violation of the constitutional right to due process, the apparent need to remedy 
environmental pollution appears to outweigh the constitutional rights of corporations and their 
officers.”  See also, Brenda S. Hustis, John Y. Gotanda, The Responsible Corporate Officer 
Doctrine: Designated Felon or Legal Fiction?, 25 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 169, 169 (Winter 1994) 
(“Such a sweeping application of the RCO doctrine could result in felony level criminal liability 
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being imposed against a corporate officer for the environmental crime of a subordinate, even 
when the officer had no knowledge of the illegal activity, thus making the officer a ‘designated 
felon.’”); “The labyrinth of regulation in this area, the persistent legal standard of strict liability 
in many laws, the vast array of reporting requirements, and the lack of privilege with regard to 
most environmental information, all combine to make the defense of a criminal environmental
charge a difficult endeavor.”  Steven M. Morgan, P.C., Allison K. Obermann, Esq., Perils Of The 
Profession: Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine May Facilitate A Dramatic Increase In 
Criminal Prosecutions Of Environmental Offenders, 45 S.W. L.J. 1199, 1200 (Winter 1991); 
Michael S. Elder, The Criminal Provisions Of The Clean Air Act Amendments Of 1990: A 
Continuation Of The Trend Toward Criminalization Of Environmental Violations, 3 Fordham 
Envt'l L. Rep. 141 (Spring 1992).  
FN83  Sean Bellew, Daniel T. Kurz, Criminal Enforcement Of Environmental Laws: A Corporate 
Guide To Avoiding Liability, 8 Vill. Envt'l L.J. 205, 217-18 (1997). “Recent court decisions have 
‘reduced or eliminated the role of mens rea’ in environmental cases by applying the responsible 
corporate official doctrine.…  The practical effect of these decisions . . . is that ‘the traditional 
public welfare offense has now been coupled with felony level penalties.’” 
FN84 Id. 
FN85 Keith A. Onsdorff & James M. Mesnard, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in 
RCRA Criminal Enforcement: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, 22 Envt'l L. Rep. (Envt'l L. 
Inst.) 10,099, 10102 (1992) (hereinafter Onsdorff).  
FN86 Id. 
FN87 See MacDonald & Watson, White, and Baytank, discussed in Part III. 
FN88 U.S. v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1130 (3d Cir. 1979).
FN89 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(a).
FN90 Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d at n. 11.
FN91 Id. at n. 11. The extent of the court’s discussion was: “Defendants contend that the trial 
judge improperly instructed the jury that they could be found guilty as individuals when the 
indictment charged them with acting as corporate officers. The Government argued the case on 
the "responsible corporate officer doctrine" recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1974) and United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 
(1943). We have examined the judge's charge and we perceive no error in the instruction to the 
jury on this theory.”
FN92 United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 670 (3d Cir.1984)
FN93 Id. 
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FN94 U.S. v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).  
FN95 RCRA § 3008(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. §6928(d)(1), penalizes “Any person who.... (1) knowingly
transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste identified or listed under this 
subchapter.... to a facility which does not have a permit....”  
FN96 MacDonald & Watson at 51.  
FN 97 Id.
FN 98 Id. at 50-51. 
FN 99 Id. at 51. 
FN100 Id. 
FN101 United States v. Cattle King Packing Co., 793 F.2d 232, 240 (10th Cir. 
1986)(misdemeanor criminal responsibility under FDCA does not require “consciousness of 
wrongdoing”).
FN102 U.S. v. White, 766 F.Supp. 873 (E.D.Wash. 1991).  
FN103 Id. at 895. 
FN104 Id. 
FN105 Id. 
FN106 U.S. v. Baytank, Inc., 934 F.2d 599 (1991). 
FN107 Id. at 616-17. 
FN108 See generally, Part III, supra, discussing MacDonald & Watson, Johnson & Towers, and 
Baytank. 
FN109 U.S. v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1414 (10th Cir. 1991)
FN110 Id. 
FN111 Id.  Clean Water Act, §§ 301(a) & 309(c)(1); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a) & 1319(c)(1).
FN112 Brittain at 1414.
FN113 Id. 
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FN114 Id. 
FN115 “Since Dotterweich, the RCO has been refined to is current state.” Onsdorff at 10101. 
FN116 Richard G. Singer, The Myth of the Doctrine of the Responsible Corporate Officer, 6 
Tox.L.Rep. (BNA) 1378, 1380 n. 26 (Apr. 8, 1992).  
FN117 U.S. v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998).  
FN118 Id. at 1018. 
FN119 Id. 
FN120 Id. 
FN121 Id. 
FN 122 U.S. v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 531 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding no formal designation 
required to establish individual as responsible corporate officer). 
FN123 Id. at 530. 
FN124 Id. 
FN125 Id. 
FN126 Id. at 531.
FN127 Id. 
FN128 U.S. v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1993).
FN129 Id. at 1087. 
FN130 Id. at 1087-88.
FN131 Id. 
FN132 Id.  See also, U.S. v. Kelly, 167 F.3d 1176 (7th Cir. 1999) (jury could infer knowledge of 
hazardous properties of waste and incur criminal liability through his responsibility for waste 
handling, his frequent visits to facility, and familiarity with age, location, contents of storage 
drums).
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FN133 Self, 2 F.3d at 1088.
FN 134 U.S. v. Hopkins, 53 F.3d 533 (2nd Cir. 1995).  
FN135 Id. at 542. 
FN136 Id. 
FN137 Id. 
FN 138 For a discussion of the willful blindness doctrine in environmental crimes, see Karen M. 
Hansen, “Knowing” Environmental Crimes, 16 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 987, 990-92 (1990).  
FN139 Brenda S. Hustis, John Y. Gotanda, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine: 
Designated Felon or Legal Fiction?, 25 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 169, 169 (Winter 1994). 
FN140 See, e.g.,, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 25-7-122.1(b) (2003) “Person” includes, in addition to 
the entities referred to in section 25-7-103(19), any responsible corporate officer.”  
FN141 People ex rel. Madigan v. Tang, 805 N.E.2d 243, 255 (Ill. App. Dist. 2004) (“Regardless, 
the responsible corporate officer doctrine requires specific allegations of corporate responsibility 
with regard to the wrongful acts, rather than just general allegations of corporate 
responsibility.”); State, Dept. of Envt’l Protection v. Standard Tank Cleaning Corp., 665 A.2d 
753, 764 (N.J.Super. 1995) (“Since the WPCA was designed to establish a state system for 
enforcement of the provisions of the Federal Clean Water Act (citations omitted), it is reasonable 
to construe the term "responsible corporate official" as used in N.J.S.A. 58:10A-3(l ) in 
conformity with the concept of "responsible corporate officer" developed in Dotterweich and 
Park and applied in Brittain. Under this view, an individual may not be held liable for a 
corporation's violation of the WPCA simply because he or she occupies the position of corporate 
officer or director. Instead, there must be a showing that a corporate officer had actual 
responsibility for the condition resulting in the violation or was in a position to prevent the 
occurrence of the violation but failed to do so. Stated another way, we construe the WPCA to 
impose liability only upon corporate officers who are in control of the events that result in the 
violation. Absent such a showing, a corporate officer cannot be said to be ‘responsible’ for the 
violation.”).  
FN142 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946) (criminal conspirator is criminally 
responsible for substantive crimes of coconspirators committed during the course of and in 
furtherance of the conspiracy which are reasonably foreseeable). The Tenth Circuit found this as 
an alternative to liability in U.S. v. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1088 (10th Cir. 1993).  Aider and abettor 
liability is a further means to establish a link up the corporate chain.  See id. 
FN143 United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Criminal and Civil Enforcement of 
Environmental Laws: Do We Have All the Tools We Need?, Testimony of Ronald A. Sarachan 
(July 30, 2002).  Mr. Sarachan was a former Chief of the Environmental Crimes Section at the 
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U.S. Dept. of Justice.
FN144 There is no requirement that the government pursue civil actions prior to the initiation of 
criminal proceedings in Environmental statutes.  U.S. v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d 1123, 1124 
(1979). 
FN145 United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Criminal and Civil Enforcement of 
Environmental Laws: Do We Have All the Tools We Need?, Testimony Ronald A. Sarachan (July 
30, 2002).  There have been a number of convictions for violations of work practice standards of 
asbestos removal under the CAA.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Tomlinson, 189 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(unpublished opinion); U.S. v. Itzkowitz, 1998 WL 812573 (E.D.N.Y.). 
FN146 Id. 
FN147 Id. 
FN148 Id. 
FN149 Richard Lazarus, Meeting The Demands Of Integration In The Evolution Of 
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 Geo. L.J. 2407, 2441 (Sept. 
1995) (hereinafter Lazarus); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: 
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U.L.Rev. 193, 
213-17 (1991); David A. Barker, Environmental Crimes, Prosecutorial Discretion, And The 
Civil/Criminal Line, 88 Vir. L.Rev. 1387, 1390-91 (Oct. 2001) (“When the law criminalizes all 
violators, it is the prosecutor, not the statute, that determines which violators will be held 
criminally liable.”)
FN150 See generally, id. 
FN151 CAA § 113(c)(4); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(4).  “Any person who negligently releases into 
the ambient air any hazardous air pollutant listed pursuant to section 7412 of this title or any 
extremely hazardous substance listed pursuant to section 11002(a)(2) of this title that is not listed 
in section 7412 of this title, and who at the time negligently places another person in imminent 
danger of death or serious bodily injury shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine under Title 
18, or by imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both.”
FN152 Lazarus at 2444.  
FN153 CWA § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1).  
FN154 Lazarus at 2431.
FN155 Id. at 2443.  
FN156 Id.  at 2444. 
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FN157 Id. 
FN158 “[T]he dominant development in substantive federal criminal law over the last decade has 
been the disappearance of any clearly definable line between civil and criminal law.” John C. 
Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections On The Disappearing Tort/Crime 
Distinction In American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193, 193 (March 1991). 
FN159 Id. 
FN160 See also Kevin A. Gaynor, Jodi C. Remer, Environmental Criminal Prosecutions: Simple 
Fixes For A Flawed System, 3 Vill. Envt’l L.J. 1, 11 (1992) (hereinafter Simple Fixes) 
(“Exacerbating the lack of centralized review of environmental criminal cases is the minimum 
level of culpability required for the case to become a criminal case.… Further, some of these 
statutes require the government to show only negligence to establish criminal liability. Because 
the threshold standard is so low, whether a violation is treated criminally, civilly or 
administratively is not necessarily made through the principled and predictable application of the 
statutory scheme, but rather, can be made on the whim of an Assistant U.S. Attorney. As a 
consequence, virtually any environmental violation can be prosecuted criminally, if an Assistant 
U.S. Attorney so chooses.”); but see Kathleen Brickey, The Rhetoric Of Environmental Crime: 
Culpability, Discretion, And Structural Reform, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 115, 130 -31 (Oct. 1998).   
Brickey details how the scrutiny in the decision to prosecute environmental crimes is very 
rigorous, involving many layers of review of prosecutors, and in fact, there is no “whim” of any 
one prosecutor, as Gaynor and others insist. 
FN161 Lazarus at 2486-96
FN162 See U.S. EPA Memorandum, Exercise of Investigative Discretion (Jan. 12, 1994) (“It has 
been, and will continue to be, Justice Department policy to conduct environmental criminal 
investigations with an eye toward identifying, prosecuting, and convicting the highest ranking 
truly responsible corporate officers.”); F. Henry Habicht II, The Federal Perspective on 
Environmental Criminal Enforcement: How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envt’l L. Rep. 
(Envtl.L.Inst.) 10,478 (1987).
FN163 Id. 
FN164 Id. See also, United States Department of Justice Memorandum, Factors In Decisions On 
Criminal Prosecutions For Environmental Violations In the Context of Significant Voluntary 
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